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The gender wage gap has long interested social scientists.  Various theories have been put 
forward to explain the lower wages for women.  Due to the richness of the data available, we 
can test whether employers discriminate against women or whether the gender gap stems 
from socialisation, differences in educational choice, occupational choice, or labour market 
attachment.  Focussing on recent UK graduates, a wage gap of 12% is found as well as 
significant gender differences in the subject of graduation, sector of employment and 
feminisation of the job. Women also tend to be more altruistic and less career oriented than 
men, character traits that are less rewarded by employers.   
The unexplained component of the gap is small and a large fraction of the gap can be 
explained by subject choice, job characteristics, motivation and expectation variables. Two 
third of women agree that they expect to take career breaks for family reasons and more than 
1/3
rd of men expect their partner to sacrifice her career for childrearing responsibilities.  These 
conservative attitudes affect women’s wages even at an early stage of their career and are the 
single most important determinants of the gender wage gap.  
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A large literature on the gender wage gap exists (see Altonji and Blank, 1999 or Blau and 
Kahn, 2000, for recent surveys or Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer, 2001, for a meta-
analysis).  Typically despite the introduction of equal opportunity legislations in the sixties 
and seventies, women are still paid between 20% and 40% less then men.  Recent estimates 
for the UK are in the magnitude of a 20% gender wage gap (Harkness, 1996; Blackaby et al. 
1997; Lissenburgh, 2000, Swaffield, 2000).  Part of the gap can be explained by differences in 
the observed characteristics of both genders, such as education and experience but even 
accounting for these factors affecting productivity a substantial gap is left unexplained.  This 
unexplained gap stems from either non-observed productivity differential or employer 
discrimination.   
Becker (1971) articulates a model in which the employer’s utility is a function of the 
workforce composition rather than purely due to profit maximisation.  Employers with a taste 
for discrimination would pay men a premium in order to avoid hiring women.  Similarly, 
employers with a taste for discrimination may not promote women to more senior positions
1. 
This glass ceiling for women means that discriminating employers would not maximise 
employees’ output and thus forgo profits. In a competitive market, discriminating employers 
would be driven out of business by profit maximising employers but empirically, the sex ratio 
of the firm is not linked to profit nor survival (Hellerstein et al, 2002) even so discriminatory 
behaviours in hiring exist (Goldin and Rouse, 2000)
2.   
 
                                                 
1 The lower promotion of women may not follow from employers’ discrimination but from gender differences in 
non-market opportunities causing women to invest less in the specific human capital required to be promoted 
(Lazear and Rosen, 1990).  
2 Discriminatory behaviours are typically difficult to observe. Using a unique panel of applicants to jobs at 11 
symphonic orchestras in the US and detailed information on the hiring process, the authors find that “blind” 
auditions, in which the gender of the candidate is not revealed to the jury, result in an increased probability of 
women obtaining the job. 
  2Discrimination can also stem from fellow workers and customers.  Women may then select 
themselves in less discriminating occupations therefore depressing wages in these specific 
occupations.  Occupational crowding may also generate from social pressure, with women 
participating in the labour force being or feeling obliged to work in typically female 
occupations. 
Alternative hypotheses competing to explain the gender wage gap are numerous.  As women 
traditionally take career breaks for child rearing reasons, they may choose occupations with 
flatter wage profile (Polachek, 1981).  As, the wage gap does not increase through time for 
full-time individuals permanently employed, the wage gap may stem from lower starting 
wage and/or career breaks, which prevent women from climbing the job ladder (Manning and 
Robinson, 1999). Also women may also be more likely to work in the public sector for beliefs 
that equal opportunity policies would be better implemented (Dickens, 1993) or due to a 
belief that public sector offers better family friendly policies. More generally, women may 
trade off wages for characteristics of the job improving their family life (shorter commuting, 
hours flexibility), thus the gender wage gap can be seen as a compensating differential 
(Killingsworth, 1987). Additionally, women may be constrained in their job search by their 
partner’s decision and thus not reach the optimal match. 
To summarise, men and women are not perfect substitute, this unobserved heterogeneity 
accounts for as much as 50% of the gender wage gap (Polachek and Kim, 1994). The 
heterogeneity of workers of both genders can be traced in differences in educational choice 
(Polachek and Kim, 1994, Chevalier, 2002) and career expectations (Swaffield, 2000, Vella, 
1997). 
This empirical analysis uses a unique dataset that allows controlling for a large set of 
characteristics usually unobserved such as motivation.  This data set of young UK graduates; 
a homogenous population that has been on the labour market for a maximum of 42 months, 
  3limits participation selection, career interruption, glass ceiling and discouragement workers 
phenomena.  Furthermore, the dataset includes detailed education variables such as grade and 
subject as well as career history.  The main advantage of this dataset is to include twenty 
variables on career and life expectations, thus offering a unique opportunity to unveil some 
other components of gender’s heterogeneity.  The gender wage gap is then decomposed 
including subject of degree, occupational choice and motivations to estimate the relative 
effects of these variables at explaining the pay gap. 
The paper is organised as follow: the next section explains the reviews various decomposition 
techniques. Section 3 reviews the literature on the effect of subject choices, occupational 
choices and character traits on wages, and when possible relates it to gender differences in 
these variables. The data used for the decomposition is described in section 4 and the results 




As in the bulk of the literature, we estimate separately for both genders a log wage equation. 
  ig g ig ig X w ε β + = ln      g  =  m,  f   (1) 
The left-hand side of (1) is the log wage of individual i of gender g, the determinants of which 
are included in a vector Xig.  β g is the estimated vector of the returns to gender mean 
characteristics and ε ig is an individual error term.  The average gender gap in earning is 
decomposed between the mean difference in observed characteristics and the difference in the 
returns to these characteristics. 
  g f m g f m f m X X X w w − − + − = − = ∆ 1 ) ( ) ( ln ln β β β      (2) 
(2) can be expressed at the mean characteristics of men (m) or women (f).  The first term of 
(2) is the part of the gender pay gap that can be explained by the differences in the observed 
  4characteristics of both groups.  The second part, the unexplained component, is the portion of 
the gap that is due to differences in the returns to characteristics between the two groups.  If 
all the determinants of earnings were observed in (2) this will be equivalent to a 
discrimination effect.  As typically not all the determinants of (2) are observable, we will refer 
to this term as the unexplained component of the gender wage gap.  The choice of a reference 
group to decompose (2) is not innocuous but since neither wage function ( g β ) would exist in 
the absence of discrimination, both choices lead to biased estimates of the explained wage 
gap.  Rather than giving a weight of one to the wage function of one group and zero to the 
other, Cotton (1988) advocated the use of population weight.  The wage function that would 
prevail in a post-discrimination world ( ) can be approximated as a weighted average of the 
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The first term in (3) is the explained wage gap measured at the non-discrimination wage 
function. The unexplained component is divided into two parts: the advantage of the men 
(extra returns compared to what should be observed in a non-discriminatory world) and the 
disadvantage of women.  Neumark (1988) refutes that the wage function in the absence of 
discrimination would simply be the weighted average of the men and women current 
functions.  Instead, he advocates the use of pooled estimates to approximate  . The final 
decomposition remains similar to the one presented in (3).  Neumark’s decomposition is used 
throughout this paper. 
* β
The decomposition of the gap between explained and unexplained component is 
complemented by an analysis of the fraction of the wage gap that can be attributed to 
differences in returns.  Starting from the first term in (2): 
  5  g f m g X X β ) ( − = ∆          ( 4 )  
g ∆ reflects the increase in female wages estimated at the price of gender g if the endowment 
differential were eliminated. However, Brown and Corcoran (1997) point out that such a 
measure would not be independent of the metrics used. For example, a dummy variable such 
as ethnicity would have opposite effect on the wage differential when the base category is 
fixed at white rather than non-white. To avoid these metric problems, Brown and Corcoran 
advocates the use of an alternative defined as: 
            ( 5 )   f m ∆ − ∆ = ∆
The interpretation of   is simply that an elimination of the endowment differential for 
variable X, would lead to a pay increase of   if estimated at the male prices rather than the 
female prices.   is small if either the difference in endowment is small or the differences in 
the returns are small, thus   provides a measure of the contribution of a specific variable to 






III literature  
 
3.1 Subject effects 
The human capital theory suggests that individuals invest in their education until the current 
value of the future earnings associated with the level s of education equals the cost of that 
year of education.  The cost can be split between the direct cost of education (fees) and the 
forgone earnings (wages that could have been obtained during that extra year of education). 
Formally, the optimal schooling decision is the value of S for which the net present value of 
the steam of income (w) associated with educational level S equals the total cost of an extra 
year of education (cost of education, C plus forgone earnings, w(S-1)): 
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where r(s) is the discount rate of an individual with education level S and T is the expected 
working life of the individual.  This simple model can be modified to explain the choice of a 
university major, where the probability of success in each subject is included (Montmarquette 
et al, 2002).  These authors note that for men but not for women, the choice of subject is 
based on the financial returns of this decision.  Men take more risks of failing for higher 
returns while women are more risk adverse, and chose the subject with the greatest prospects 
of success and possibly for which they have the highest affinity. These behaviours are 
consistent with higher earnings for men but also more educational regret when accounting for 
wages (Chevalier, 2002). 
While participation to higher education is nearly at parity for the cohort of interest, there are 
marked differences in the choice of subjects (see Table 1).  Based on the university records, 
students segregate themselves by gender with scientific subjects being male dominated while 
Arts/Humanities based subjects have a higher female participation. A measure of segregation, 
such as the Duncan index suggests that around 30% of women would have to change their 
subjects to make the distribution of majors identical between both genders
3. Despite large 
changes in attendance to higher education and to the gender mix, there is no evidence that 
subject segregation by gender has been reduced over the 1985-95 period, as the indices of 
segregation are of similar magnitude.  Subjects most popular with women are associated with 
lower grades (McNabb et al., 2002), higher risk of unemployment and over-education and 
lower average pay in general (Chevalier, 2002). 
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(pfi) is the share of the male (female) sample observed in subject i, and k is the number of subjects.  
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Subject choice impacts on earnings directly and indirectly.  A small literature on the returns to 
higher education by subject exists.  For the UK specifically, large variation in the returns by 
subjects is found with scientific majors usually at the top of the distribution and Arts, 
Languages and Social Sciences towards the bottom (Chevalier et al., 2002, for a review).  For 
all majors, the returns are higher for women than for men and the differences are the largest 
for Arts and Education graduates.  This does not indicate that female graduates earn more 
than their male counterparts, but mostly reflects that higher education reduces the gender 
wage gap. 
Brown and Corcoran (1997) for the US, Baraka (1999) for Taiwan and Machin and Puhani 
(2002) for the UK and Germany have specifically estimated the effect of university major on 
the gender wage gap.  Including subject of graduation typically increases the explained 
component of the gender wage gap by 6 to 17 percentage points and a staggering 35% for 
Brown and Corcoran using the NLS72.  Machin and Puhani also test whether subject 
aggregation matters. With the most detailed subject specification (124 and 71 subjects 
respectively for the UK and Germany), the increased in the part of the explained wage gap 
due to subject dummies doubles for the UK while the increase is less substantial in Germany
4.   
 
3.2 Occupation effects 
For discrimination, socialisation or taste reasons, women choose different type of occupation 
and sector of activity.  Figure 1 plots the proportion of graduates employed in the public 
                                                 
4 The high disaggregation of subjects may bias the results of the decomposition.  For subjects with a large gender 
imbalance and a small number of observations, the subject estimates in the wage equation for the “minority” 
gender are imprecise and are multiply by the mean gender difference in participation (which is large) in order to 
calculate the explained component of the differential. 
  8sector, six months after graduation, in 1993
5.  Almost all graduates from Medicine and to a 
lower extent from Education work in the public sector.  What is more remarkable is the 
statistically significant difference in the proportion working in the public sector by gender; 
37% of female graduates work in the public sector 6 months after graduations but only 23% 
of males do so.  This gender gap in public sector employment is observed for most subjects 
and the highest differences are found for graduates from studies allied to Medicine, 
Education, Librarianship and Social Sciences.  The preference for working in the public 
sector and thus encountering a pay penalty between 7% and 12% (Chevalier et al., 2002) may 
be due to character traits, or in the case of women, a belief that the public sector provides a 
more equal and family friendly environment (Dickens, 1993). 
Socialisation affects occupational behaviour in three ways (Corcoran and Courant, 1985).  
First, socialisation may affect character traits directly, so that women are more caring and 
altruistic than men.  Second, children may internalised sex-roles and reproduce them in their 
occupational choices; third, socialisation influences the values attached to activities. Hence it 
is observed that women’s participation to the labour force is concentrated in a limited number 
of occupations.  This concentration, which could also be due to discrimination, has a negative 
effect on wages (Backer and Fortin, 1999). The penalty for working in a female dominated 
occupation is larger for women than men (Brown and Corcoran, 1997) but this finding is not 
universal and others reckon that wages are lower for the minority gender in a given 
occupation. 
 
3.3 character choice 
Recently, economists have integrated character traits to determinants of wages. Leadership, 
motivation and self-esteem but also aggression, beauty and cleanness are among the traits 
                                                 
5 This graph is based on the First Destination Survey, a survey of the universe of students conducted 6 months 
after graduation. 
  9positively correlated with wages (see Bowles et al., 2001, for a survey).  Even for traits that 
appear trivial, the effect on wages can be quite large.  For example, increasing beauty from 
below average to above average increases the hourly wage of male American lawyers by 14% 
(Hamermesh and Biddle, 1994). The impact of these characteristics also differ by gender; in 
high occupation status, Osborne (2001) using the UK National Child Development Study 
estimates that a one standard deviation change in aggression increases the earnings of men by 
20% but reduces those of females by 14%.  Due to socialisation, character traits differ by 
gender, with women being more altruistic and men selfish and competitive.  However, the 
main attitudinal difference between men and women concern the childrearing role. 
Most of the literature on the gender wage gap has stressed the importance of career 
interruptions and family responsibilities, but only a few have incorporated a measure of the 
attachment to the labour force. Vella (1994) use an attitude index to divide the population of 
young Australian between modern and traditional relative to the role of women and report a 
large effect of modernity on female educational attainment (moderns are 10 percentage points 
more likely to attend university). Furthermore, it is the nature of the investment and not its 
quantity that generates lower returns for individuals with traditional attitudes. Swaffield 
(2000) builds a similar index for the British working population and conclude that work 
motivation is a significant determinant of wages and since women are less career oriented, the 
omission of motivation reduces the explained gender wage gap  
 
IV Data 
The empirical evidence is based on a recent cohort of UK graduates thus limiting the effect of 
selection in the labour market, disappointment due to discrimination and glass ceiling.  The 
data originates from a postal survey of individuals who graduated in June 1996 from a sample 
of 33 UK tertiary education institutions (Ellias et al., 1998).  The individuals were contacted 
  10by their university Alumni and the survey includes a complete history of the 42 months 
elapsed since graduating.  Mature students and individuals with disabilities are excluded and 
only individuals graduating with a first degree are kept, leaving a sample of 7,640 graduates. 
The survey includes a wealth of information on university attainment and current 
employment. One of the drawbacks of the survey is that the annual gross wage is reported in 
category, and more importantly, the number of hours worked per week is not reported.  Since, 
women work on average less than men, the gender wage gap using annual wage is biased 
upward.  To limit this bias, only full-time employees are kept; this proportion is identical for 
men and women (85%) limiting the effect of selection on estimated wages.  Finally, we drop 
individuals who did not report their current wage or occupation, not living in the UK and with 
missing values on the variables of interest; this leaves us with a sample of 5187 graduates. 
This dataset is unique as it includes 20 questions on character traits, motivation and 
expectations, divided into two sets, with answers coded on a 5 points scale from very 
important (1) to unimportant (5)
6.  The first set deals with job values while the second set 
contains career expectations.  The distributions of answers to these questions are reported 
separately by gender in Tables 2A and 2B.  Apart from the importance of status and respect, 
leisure and concern with current affair, the long-term values of graduates are gender 
differentiated.  Men are more likely to state that career development and financial are very 
important long-term values, while women put forwards, personal development, job 
satisfaction, being valued by employer and doing a socially useful job.  On the latter the 
gender difference is large, 50% of women agree that a socially useful job is important or very 
important, but only 33% of men make the same statement and 35% of them think that it is not 
important or unimportant.  This difference in the type of jobs wanted explains the high 
feminisation of jobs such as teacher and nurse.  Women are also more likely to be concerned 
                                                 
6 In order to avoid dropping another 9% of the sample, we recoded individuals with a missing statement to not 
sure. Xxx redo analysis with and without, does it make any change 
  11by local issues and ecology.  The gender differences in long-term values are rather consistent 
with stereotypes with men being less altruistic than women. 
This is backed up with the findings on career expectations, with men being 10 percentage 
points more likely to strongly agree that they are extremely ambitious.  The only other gender 
differences in career expectations concern career breaks.  Despite improvements in family 
friendly policies, 66% of women still expect to take breaks for family reasons (agree 
somewhat or strongly) and only 17% expect their partner to do so.  Men favours this 
repartition of tasks with 40% of them expecting their partner to take a career break for family 
reasons and only 12% of them expecting to do it themselves.  Furthermore, the reintegration 
to the labour market may not be a priority with a third of women not expecting to work until 
retirement.  Indices summarising the information on these statements are also constructed
7.  
The two indices are then normalised. Surprisingly, the two indices are not correlated (-0.05).  
All other relevant variables are reported in Table 3.  The distribution of wages is reported in 
Figure 2.  The mean pay in 1998 is £18,500 for women and £21,200 for men, but these mean 
characteristics hide differences in the distribution of pay between genders.  The distribution is 
shifted to the left for women 
 
V results 
Traditionally, the pay gap is decomposed between the differences in observed characteristics 
between men and women and the differences in the returns to characteristics by gender; the 
latter terms reflecting the unexplained part of the differential.  A large share of the wage gap 
is usually left unexplained.  We argue that gender differences in the educational choices 
(majors) career choices (occupation) and expectations (character traits), typically not included 
                                                 
7 The indices are constructed by allocating points to the answers, 5 for strongly agree to 1 for strongly disagree, 
after adjusting the questions for career orientations, thus personal development, job satisfaction, socially useful 
job, concern in local issue, ecology and current affairs were inverted.  Similarly, the statements concerning 
fulfilment from work, I work to live and expect to take career breaks, that are negative values as far as career are 
concerned were inverted to calculate the career expectations index. 
  12in the decomposition, should account for differences in taste and socialization, therefore 
identifying the unexplained component of the wage gap.  The remaining unexplained 
component may then be interpreted as resulting from some form of discrimination, if we 
believe that all relevant controls have been included.  However, educational and occupational 
choices as well as character traits may themselves be the results of discrimination and 
socialisation, so it is more appropriate to keep the terminology of explained and unexplained 
components.  
Various variables determine the wages of individuals independently from their gender; these 
variables are typically age, work experience, education and other personal or job 
characteristics.  Since, the population of interest in this study is rather homogenous, the 
variation in wages is limited and the raw gender gap in yearly gross wage is “only” 12.4%.  
This gap can be decomposed between a component due to gender differences in the mean 
observed characteristics and two components reflecting the disadvantage of women and the 
advantage of men compared to an “average” individual in a non-discriminating world.   
The base model is estimated with a parsimonious specification including a quadratic in labour 
market experience, and dummies for graduating after the age of 24, being white and region of 
residence.  Due to the specificity of the population, this base model explains only 10% of the 
wage gap suggesting that in the early months of graduates’ careers, the variation in the 
endowment in these observed variables is limited.   
As reported in Table 4, the second specification includes various measures of educational 
achievement such as A-level score, degree results, institution type and post-graduate 
achievements which broadly speaking are correlated with ability.  These variables account for 
60% of the explained wage gap and their inclusion double the proportion of the gender wage 
gap that can be explained by differences in endowment to 20%.  However, the inclusion of 
controls for the subject of graduations (model 2’) eliminates the explanatory powers of these 
  13educational variables.  Thus, the wage gap for graduates does not originate in differences in 
educational attainment but from subject segregation with women graduating from subjects 
with lower financial returns. Model 2 findings stems from the differences in A-level 
achievements, probability of gaining first honours and institution type by subjects, rather than 
gender differences in these characteristics.  Subject of graduations alone account for almost 
90% of the explained wage gap, raising concern on the conclusions of other empirical work 
where these variables were not included. The origin of this segregation can be found in 
socialisation, discrimination and character differences. 
In order to test for discrimination at the work place, the base model is enriched with 
characteristics of the work place (size, sector), type of contract and feminisation
8 of the 
occupation.  These variables account for 90% of the explained wage gap, which rises to 56% 
of the raw gap.  Typically, differences in firm type, contracts and feminisation by gender are 
large.  It can be argued that these variations stem from employers discrimination or social 
pressure and therefore does not allow any conclusion on employers’ discrimination. 
Specification 3’ also adds dummies for occupational group.  This follows from arguments on 
the glass ceiling and the concentration of women in jobs at the bottom of the socio-economic 
ladder and their lower promotions to high paying jobs.  Since, the observed graduates have 
been in the labour market for 42 months, differences in promotions are likely to be reduced 
and the current positions occupied mostly reflects the point of entry.  The inclusion of these 
variables has no (even negative) effect on the explained wage gap, suggesting that early on in 
their career, there is no gender difference in the occupational attainment of graduates.  This 
result could also stem from the broad definition of social group used here (Kidd and Shannon, 
1996). 
                                                 
8 This is constructed at the 2-digit occupational code level from the 1996 Labour Force Survey, quarter 3, for all 
employees aged 16-59.  Backer and Fortin (1999) state that results on the effect of feminisation on the gender 
wage gap are sensitive to the level of aggregation of the feminisation variable.  Two-digit level is the most 
detailed level of aggregation attainable with the graduate dataset. 
  14Models 4 and 4’ extend the base model by adding information on the character of the 
individuals, respectively, the character scores or the 20 individuals character traits.   
Surprisingly, these two models lead to different conclusions.  Normalised scores have no 
effect on the model and do not reduce the gender wage gap, while the model including all 
character traits explains 64% of the raw gap; job expectations account for 52% of the 
explained gap and career expectations for another 39%. Thus, character traits and 
expectations differences between genders are a main determinant of the wage gap.  The origin 
of these differences are difficult to determine, but as stated by Corcoran and Courant (1985) 
“socialization may directly affect workers’ skills and personality traits (p275)”, thus policies 
reducing the gender wage gap could only be effective in the long-run after attitudes have been 
adjusted, which is consistent with the observations that after the rapid reduction of the wage 
gap when equal opportunity laws were introduced, progress have been much slower.   
Model 5 and 5’ include all the covariates. Model 5 explains 58% of the wage gap; most come 
from the job specific characteristics.  The effect of the education variables, which in model 2 
accounted for 60% of the explained wage gap, is halved.  The full model (5’) explains 84% of 
the wage gap, with the advantage of men and disadvantage of women being almost equal.  
Differences in job and career expectations account for the bulk of the explained gap but the 
introduction of these expectation variables does not eliminate the effect of subject segregation 
and job characteristics.  Socialisation affects the educational and occupational choices of 
young graduates as well as their job and career expectations, but these variables are not 
perfectly correlated and should all be included in a wage gap analysis. 
In order to assess in more details the factors responsible for the wage gap, we now reports the 
wage estimates for our preferred specification (5’). Due to the young age of the population the 
experience profile is inverted for the first 18 months.  Even accounting for labour market 
experience, workers aged 26-29 earn 6% more than younger graduates. As expected graduates 
  15living in the tighter and more costly labour markets are paid a premium and there is no ethnic 
discrimination.  For these base-model variables no gender variation in the returns is found, but 
since the men have 8% more month of work experience than women (Table 3), an 
equalisation would have some effect on the gender wage gap (Delta is reported in Table 5, 
using (5).  The sum of the   for the base model is nil; these variables have no effect on the 
gender wage gap of graduates. 
∆
The type of institution attended has a substantial effect on returns for both genders, older 
institutions providing either more able graduates or a network effect. The premium to 
attending an older institution rather than a 60’s university is larger for men.  Other signal of 
ability also provide important returns; a first class honour increases wages by 5 to 12% 
compare to other grades and the premium compared to an upper second honour is 
significantly larger for women.  Since women are also more likely to obtain a 2/1, a levelling 
to the men’s standard would penalise women.  Even if variations in the mean educational 
characteristics and their returns are apparent, most education variables have insignificant or 
negative   thus their global impact on the gender wage gap is negative ( =-0.003).  ∆ ∆
Arts graduates have the lowest returns to tertiary education, and are penalised by 19% 
compared to female graduates in Maths or Medicine; the wage gap penalty for graduating 
from arts rather than those subjects is even larger for men.  Added to the gender variation in 
the choice of degree, the gender differences in returns means that these variables contribute to 
the gender wage gap; Maths, Medicine and Engineering all have ∆  around .005. 
Women are more likely to work in small firms, possibly for convenience reasons, since as 
small firms are more evenly spread, the commuting to work is smaller.  Another view is that 
women are constrained in their job search by the match realised by their partner.  It is 
however surprising that these differences are observed at an early career point.  Alternatively, 
  16differences in confidence and ambitions may explain the gender differences in firm choice.  It 
is well known that smaller firms pay lower wages, but the spread is less important for women. 
Female graduates work in an occupation with 50% more female workers and the wage penalty 
associated with working in a female occupation is twice as large as for men.  Thus, the wage 
penalty associated with working in a female dominated occupation is larger for women, as in 
Brown and Corcoran, and the   reaches –0.013.  Women are as likely as men to get a 
permanent contract (80%) but men’s returns to a permanent contract are 70% higher.  In 
contradiction with the double imbalance whereby pay in the public sector is higher at low 
level of the occupational ladder but less at high level, we find that after accounting for 
education and various career expectations, graduates in the public sector are better paid than 
those in the private sector.  This result could stem from differences in the earning profiles in 
the two sectors, with flatter profiles and higher starting salaries being found in the public 
sector.  Women are twice as likely to work in the public sector than men, since typical female 
graduate occupations, such as nurses and teachers, are almost exclusively found in the public 
sector.  Differences in the job characteristics and the returns to these characteristics by gender 
are important, and the ∆  for these variables reaches (-0.007). 
∆
At the large level of aggregation used, the distributions of occupations are rather similar for 
both genders, but the returns do vary, thus these variables contribute to the gap.  As seen in 
Tables 2A and 2B, large variations in the expectations of men and women are observed.  
These measures of motivations are also rewarded differently on the labour market.  Women 
who are motivated by financial rewards, status, international experience and claim to be 
ambitious are rewarded while those favouring career development and surprisingly who 
expect to work until retirement suffer from a pay penalty.  Men concern with ecological issue 
and doing a socially useful job, two female traits, are penalised, while these character traits 
had no significant effect on female wages.  This could reflect that men with non-traditional 
  17motivation are discriminated against.  Like women, men who are motivated by financial 
rewards, international experience and claim to be ambitious are paid more, but the returns are 
somewhat larger for men.  Furthermore, those with a traditional attitude regarding the family 
(expecting their partner to take a break in her career for family reasons) are also paid 3% 
more.  The data does not allow us to differentiate between a reward for being traditionalist 
and reverse causality, where richer men can support their family and expect their partner to 
have a traditional role.  These results on attitude towards family roles are in contradiction with 
Vella (1994) who reports that modern attitude affects women’s wages positively and has no 
effect on male wages.  Differences in attitudes towards family role are the main two 
determinants of the gender wage gap. 
 
Conclusion 
Even looking at a homogenous population of recent UK graduates a wage gap of 12% is 
found.  The dataset is rich of covariates usually not available in this type of studies, which 
allows us to control not only for typical human capital variables but also for the subject of 
university study, occupation and character traits.  These character traits also measure attitudes 
towards childrearing.  We found significant gender differences in the subject of graduation, 
the sector of employment and feminisation of the job, but also conforming to the stereotypes, 
women are more altruistic and men more selfish and career driven.  Conform to socialisation 
and self-selection models of the gender wage gap, women invest in a different type of human 
capital, are more likely to work in the public sector and female dominated occupations.  These 
differences remain even when accounting for motivation and expectations.  With this 
extended specification, 84% of the gender wage gap can be explained, so it would appear that 
discrimination is limited (at least for this population of recent graduates).  However, the 
  18differences in subject and occupation choice or characters may be due to some discrimination 
and social pressure. 
A large proportion of the wage gap originates from attitudes towards childrearing; 2/3
rd of 
women agree that they expect to take career breaks for family reasons while only 12% of men 
do so.  Men also expect their partner to sacrifice her career for childrearing responsibilities.  
Since change in attitude may be slow, the gender wage gap is likely to persist.  Policies to 
eliminate it should reduce the disturbance of childrearing duties on women and improve 
family friendliness of firms as well as access to childcare services. Such policies would have a 
direct effect as well as a long-term effect on socialisation leading to a reduction in the gender 
differences in educational, occupational choices, character traits and career expectations. 
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  22Table 1: Distribution of subject by gender. 
Year 1985/86  1990/91  1993/94 
  Male  Female Diff  Male  Female Diff  Male  Female Diff 
Medicine  and  dentistry  7.03 6.88 0.15 6.04 6.45  0.41  5.33 5.51  0.18 
Studies  allied  to  medicine  1.51 4.35 2.84 1.65 4.67  3.02  1.76 5.29  3.54 
Biological  sciences  6.04 9.80 3.76 6.20  10.02  3.82  6.45  10.70  4.25 
Veterinary science, agriculture and related studies 1.95  1.90  0.05  1.43  1.51  0.08  1.13  1.41  0.29 
Physical  sciences  13.03 5.83  7.20 11.55 5.76 5.79  11.46 6.35 5.10 
Mathematical  sciences  8.19 4.33 3.86 9.35 3.92  5.43  9.28 3.61  5.66 
Engineering and technology  18.64  2.25  16.38  17.93  3.07  14.86  16.99  3.34  13.65 
Architecture  and  related  studies  1.67 0.76 0.91 1.67 0.67  0.99  1.98 0.63  1.35 
Social  sciences  14.19 16.55  2.36  14.12 16.03 1.91 14.39 15.26 0.87 
Business  and  financial  studies  4.66 3.87 0.79 5.53 4.64  0.90  5.21 4.33  0.88 
Librarianship  and  information  science  0.05 0.34 0.28 0.11 0.27  0.16  0.22 0.43  0.21 
Languages and related studies  5.64  18.92  13.28  5.41  16.43  11.03  6.18  16.94  10.76 
Humanities  6.23 7.89 1.66 6.42 7.31  0.89  7.27 8.40  1.14 
Creative  arts  1.27 2.27 1.00 1.21 2.29  1.08  1.18 2.24  1.06 
Education  0.57 2.62 2.05 0.76 3.18  2.41  0.69 3.10  2.41 
Multi-disciplinary  studies  9.31  11.44  2.13  10.62 13.79 3.17 10.48 12.42 1.94 
Total  100 100    100 100    100 100   
Duncan  index     29.36     27.97      26.649 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5Table 3: Summary statistics- Mean (standard deviation) 
 Women  Men  All    Women Men  All 






     
Education 
characteristics      Job chracteristics     











No A level  0.11 0.17 0.13  Size <10  0.05 0.04 0.05 
First-class honours  0.06 0.08 0.07  Size 10-24  0.11 0.06 0.09 
Upper second  0.52 0.44 0.49  Size 25-49  0.10 0.07 0.09 
Second honours  0.34 0.36 0.35  Size 50-249  0.19 0.19 0.19 
Other honours  0.07 0.13 0.09  Size 250-499  0.07 0.08 0.07 
Arts  0.15 0.08 0.12  Size 500+  0.47 0.56 0.51 
Humanities  0.10 0.06 0.08  Manager  0.23 0.24 0.23 
Languages  0.07 0.02 0.05  Professional  0.38 0.35 0.36 
Law  0.04 0.04 0.04 
Associate 
professional  0.20 0.22 0.21 
Social science  0.14 0.12 0.13  Clerical  0.14 0.09 0.12 
Math & computing  0.04 0.10 0.07  Other occupation  0.06 0.10 0.07 
Natural science  0.11 0.12 0.11 
% female in 
occupation  50.23 34.63 43.55 
Medicine  0.08 0.04 0.06  Permanent contract  0.81 0.83 0.82 
Engineering  0.02 0.21 0.10  Public sector  0.27 0.13 0.21 
Business  0.10 0.12 0.11 
Personal 
characteristics     
Education  0.10 0.02 0.06  Age 26-29  0.37 0.41 0.39 
Other vocational  0.04 0.05 0.05  White  0.95 0.92 0.93 
Interdisciplinary  0.02 0.02 0.02  Character traits     
Old university  0.41 0.41 0.41  Job value  -0.02 0.02 0.00 
60’s university  0.10 0.11 0.11  Career expectation  -0.06 0.08 0.00 
90’s university  0.38 0.43 0.40       
College of HE  0.12 0.04 0.08  Observation  2967 2220 5187 
Post Grad certificate  0.21 0.12 0.17       
Professional qualification  0.15 0.15 0.15       
Master  0.09 0.11 0.10       
Ph.D  0.02 0.02 0.02       

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Table 5: Wage functions and Differences in coefficients * differences in means 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Partner take breaks  -0.006  0.030  0.016  0.019 
  30 (1.64)  (3.79)  (4.71)   
















Observations 2967  2220  5187   
R-squared 0.37  0.41  0.39   
Note: Also include dummies for region of residence. 
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